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The  IATRC is a group  of more than 100 economists interested in agricultural
trade,  drawn  from the academic  community,  government,  and private  institutions
in North America and seven other countries.  Founded in 1980,  the Consortium has
the following  objectives:
(1)  to facilitate  and  stimulate  improvement  in the  quality  and  relevance
of international  agricultural  trade research  and policy  analysis;
(2)  to  facilitate  collaborative  research  among  its  members;
(3)  to  facilitate  interaction  among  researchers  and  analysts  in  different
countries  engaged  in trade  research;  and
(4)  to improve the general understanding of international  trade  and trade
policy issues  among the public at  large.
To further  these objectives,  the Consortium  has analyzed  a number  of trade
issues and problems associated with the current round of international  negotiations
under  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  The  first  efforts  were
presented  at  the  Symposium  held  in  August  1988  and  published  as  a  series  of
Commissioned  Papers:  -
(1)  Assessing  the Benefits  of Trade  Liberalization
(2)  Designing Acceptable  Agricultural  Policies
(3)  Negotiating  a  Framework  for Action.
The IATRC,  together  with members  of the International  Policy  Council  on
Agriculture  and  Trade  (IPC),  subsequently  identified  additional  issues.  The  IPC,
founded in  1987,  is comprised of 30 agricultural  leaders from twenty countries  with
the  goal  of  developing  economically  and  politically  realistic  policy  options  to
problems  facing  global agriculture.
This  analysis  has  been  published  as  a  continuation  of  the  IATRC
Commissioned  Paper series:
(4)  Tariffication  and  Rebalancing
(5)  Potential Use  of an Aggregate  Measure  of Support
(6)  Reinstrumentation  of Agricultural  Policies.
For  further copies of these  reports or information  on this  IATRC  activity,  contact:
Professor  Maury  E.  Bredahl
Department  of Agricultural  Economics
University  of Missouri-Columbia
Columbia,  Missouri  65211
United  States  of America
Telephone:  314-882-4512Tariffication  and Rebalancing
Tariffication  refers  to  the  conversion  of  all  non-tariff  import  measures  to
fixed  tariffs.  It is seen both  as a desirable policy  change  and as  a first step toward
reduction  of the levels of protection presently implied by non-tariff import barriers.
Rebalancing implies  modification  of levels of protection  to achieve  a better balance
between  closely-related  products.  In  the context  of the GATT  round,  rebalancing
would  be  accomplished  as  a  part  of the  overall  reduction  in  trade  barriers  and
support  levels.  Tariffication  is  an  avowed  negotiating  objective  of  the  US,  and
rebalancing  is championed  by the  EC.  Success  or failure  in  these  two  aspects  of
the  negotiations  will  go  some  way  to  determining  the  outcome  of the  Uruguay
Round  in  agriculture.
The  GATT  Work  Programme  for  agriculture,  which  came  out  of the  Mid-
Term Agreement  in April,  specifies six areas in which  detailed proposals are invited
by  December  1989.  These  six  areas  are:
the  terms and  use of  an  aggregate  measure  of support;
- strengthened  and  more  operationally  effective  GATT  rules  and
disciplines;
the  modalities  of  special  and  differential  treatment  for  developing
countries;
- sanitary  and  phytosanitary  regulations;
- tariffication,  decoupled  income  support,  and  other  ways  to  adapt
support  and protection;
ways  to  take  account  of the  possible  negative  effects  of the  reform
process  on net  food-importing  developing  countries.1
Tariffication  clearly comes within  the fifth  of these items, along with  other aspects
of the  "reinstrumentation  of  national  policies."  It  is  generally  understood  that
"rebalancing" is included among the "other" ways in which support could be adapted.
In  June  1989  the  United  States  tabled  a  discussion  paper  that  dealt
specifically  with  the  issue  of  tariffication.2  It  also  forms  a  major  plank  in  the
comprehensive proposal  submitted by the United States in  October  1989.3  The  EC
has yet to  table  a paper on  rebalancing, but  clearly it sees  success  in this  area  as
important  to its own negotiating  objectives.  This report  is designed  to clarify some
of the  issues that  lie  behind  the  United  States  and  EC  positions,  and to  develop
constructive  ideas  to  further the negotiations  in  Geneva.
Tariffication  as  an Aspect  of  Trade Reform
The  concept  of  tariffication  (the conversion  of non-tariff  import  barriers to
tariffs)  was  first introduced  into  the Uruguay  Round  by  the United  States  in  its
submission  to the agricultural negotiating  group of November  1988.4  The idea had
previously  been  proposed  by the United States  to the  GATT  Committee  on  Trade
in Agriculture  in  February 1985,  but  found  little  support  from  other  countries.
Paarlberg  suggests  that  it  was  at  that  time  "an  improvised  international
accompaniment" to  the Administration's 1985  Farm  Bill  proposal,  which  proposed
a  radical scaling  down  of  domestic  farm  support.5  Its  reemergence  at  this stage
of  the  negotiations  reflects  concern  on  behalf  of  US  export  interests  that  the
negotiation  of  general  reductions  in  support might  not  yield  quick  and  tangible
improvements  in  market  access.  It  also  reflects  satisfaction  in  the United  Stateswith  the  outcome  of  bilateral  talks  with  Japan  that  yielded  an  agreement  to
convert that country's beef import quota system to tariffs.  But no matter what the
motive behind the proposal,  clearly  the issue  is  firmly  on  the table  in the  GATT
talks as  a major part of the US  approach  to the negotiations.
Advantages  and drawbacks of tariffs
Tariffs  have  clear  advantages  over  other  import  barriers--at  least,  to  the
exporter.  They  are  transparent,  negotiable,  relatively  stable  and apply  equally  to
all  exporters,  subject  to  any  preferential  arrangements.  Compared  with  the
arbitrariness of licenses,  the volatility  of variable  levies, the capriciousness  of state
trading  and the  uncertainty  of quotas,  a  tariff is  a  benign  trade  barrier.  While
they may not be  able  to  eliminate  the biases often  found  in  internal  distribution
systems,  they  will  tend  to  introduce  more  competition  and  openness  in  such
markets.  As  emphasized  by  the  US  paper,  tariffs  also  help  to  ensure  that
importing regions  share in adjustments to market shares  and trends.  World  price
variations are transmitted  to domestic markets when the only protection is a tariff.
To  the  importer,  however,  the  situation  is  less  clear  cut.  Non-tariff
measures  are usually  in place for a purpose.  State  trading is often  a reflection  of
the role of government in domestic marketing as well  as in international  commerce;
switching to tariffs will require more than just a trade policy shift.  Variable  levies
are designed  to stabilize  domestic  prices,  and  tariffs  do  away  with  such  domestic
market stability.6  Import quotas are often used as ways of conferring  direct benefit
to  particular  exporting  countries,  and  may  be  a  part  of  a  country's  overseas
development  policy:  tariffs  ensure  that  the  "rent" from  the  trade  restriction  is
collected by the importing  country  and does not  accrue  to the  developing  country
exporter.'  Import quotas also provide stability in employment  to refining activities
and port  facilities.  Licenses confer  market regulation  power to  public bodies that
under tariffication  may need to be replaced  by some other  controls.  In  short, the
conversion  to  tariffs  may not be without cost for the importer,  however  much  the
exporter would prefer that means of protection.  It follows that "tariffication" must
be negotiated just as would  as any other  policy  change.
Tariffs within the GATT
The tariff is  the preferred protective  instrument  within the  GATT.  Article
XI  states  that  "no prohibitions  or  restrictions  other  than  duties,  taxes  or  other
charges, whether made effective through  quotas, import or  export licenses or other
measures,  shall be instituted or maintained" on trade between  contracting  parties.8
Such  price-based  measures  give  all  the  advantages  of transparency  noted  above.
Moreover,  the level of tariffs admissable  under the  GATT are generally  bound, and
therefore  cannot be changed without  notification, consultation  and compensation  to
injured  parties.9  Conversion  of non-tariff  barriers  (NTBs)  to  bound tariffs  was  a
major  thrust  of the  early  years  of the  GATT.  Agriculture  largely "escaped"  this
movement, partly through exceptions written into the GATT  articles and partly by
deregulations,  such  as  that  given  to  the  United  States  in  1955,  which  allowed
quantitative  import  restrictions  to  remain  as part  of domestic  farm  policy.  Any
widespread  conversion  of agricultural  NTBs  to  tariffs  would  therefore  be  a  major
step  in the direction  of incorporating  agriculture  fully  into  the GATT.
Conversion  to  tariffs  not  only  simplifies  the  treatment  of  existing  trade
barriers within the GATT,  it also  makes  negotiations much more  straightforward.
The  reduction  of tariffs  within  the  GATT  has  been  the  most  notable  success  of
that  organization.  The  Kennedy  Round  (1963-67)  reduced  tariffs  by  about  35
percent,  using the  approach of an  "across-the-board"  formula;  in  the Tokyo  Round(1974-79)  the reduction  was  about  30 percent.1 0  Tariffs  are now  generally  low  on
industrial  goods,  many  in  the  range  of  5-8  percent,  and  do  not  form  a  major
impediment  to  trade.  The  proponents  of  tariffication  argue  that  the  new
agricultural  tariffs arising from  conversion  also  will be  successfully  reduced,  either
by special  agreement  or  in  the context  of general  tariff negotiations--at  least  over
a  period of years.
Tariffication  and other aspects  of  negotiations
The  April  Agreement,  which  completed  the Midterm  Review,  left  open  the
question  of the  means  for meeting the objective  of a long-run  reduction  in trade-
distorting  support.  The  goal  was  to be  achieved  "through negotiations  on  specific
policies  and  measures,  through  the  negotiation  of commitments  on  an  aggregate
measure of support  ... ,  or through  a combination  of these approaches."  The use
of an aggregate  measure  of support  (AMS) is  favored by the EC,  while  the United
States  sees  a  more  limited  role  for  such  a  measure.  Within  the  Cairns Group
views  differ  on  the  role  of  an  AMS.  Canada  has  generally  argued  for  a  more
central  place  for  an  AMS,  whereas  Australia  has  been  less  keen  on  such  a
development.  How  tariffication  fits  in  with  the AMS  approach  is  therefore  a key
issue  for the negotiations.
At  the  conceptual  level,  tariffication  and  the  use  of  an  AMS  are  not
alternative  modes of negotiation.  Tariffication is a policy  change,  whereas the use
of an  AMS  is  an  agreement  on how  to  measure  the  level  of support.  Conversion
of  all  non-tariff  import  barriers  to  fixed  tariffs  would  make  an  AMS  approach
easier,  but  no  less  relevant.  If,  in  addition  to  tariffication  of import  barriers,  all
other  instruments of support were  decoupled  (and  export  subsidies  banned),  then
the  AMS  equals  the  tariff,  and  the  measurement  issue  becomes  trivial.  While
policies  other  than  tariffs  remain,  then  the AMS  will  be  necessary  as  a  way  of
providing monitoring  information  on the totality of policy  impacts  on trade.  Thus,
even those  in favor of eventual  tariffication  might wish initially  to negotiate limits
on  overall  support  through the AMS.
At  the  practical  level,  it  would  appear  that  there  is  somewhat  more
"competition" between  the  move  to  tariffs and  the  use  of  an  AMS.  Tariffication
seems  to provide  an  alternative  tool  for  the United  States  (and  other  exporters)
to  use  to  pry  open  foreign  markets.  The  approach  has  had  some  success  in  the
case  of the Japanese  beef market:  the  implicit  assumption  is  made  that  the  EC
feed grain  market  will yield  to  the  same  remedy.  Use  of a tariff by the  EC  also
would  "recouple"  the  European  market  to  the  world  price  level,  and  assist  in
market  adjustments.  With  limited supplies  of negotiating  capital,  making  a push
for  tariffication  as  a  means  of  de-clawing  the  Common Agricultural  Policy  would
clearly  be  at  the  expense  of the  broader  AMS  approach.  If exporters  viewed  an
AMS  approach  as less  than totally  effective  in  opening up markets, either  because
of a poorly  conceived  AMS  variant  or  the  cunningness  of governments  in  avoiding
its implications,  then the  switch  of emphasis  could  be  attractive  to  them.
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The United States has made it clear that tariffication  cannot carry the whole
burden  of trade  reform.  Export  policies  and  domestic  subsidy  issues  also  need to
be addressed  in  the negotiations.  There has  been  no  suggestion  that the United
States  would  be happy  with  tariffication  alone.  On the  other hand,  in  any  set  of
negotiations priorities have to be set.  The final negotiated package will not contain
all  the elements  on  each  country's  "shopping list."  At  this fundamental  level  the
introduction  of tariffication  is bound  to  have  an  impact  on  the  progress  in  other
areas  of agricultural  negotiation.Tariffication in  Practice
Whatever  the merits  of tariffication  at  a conceptual  and  strategic  level,  the
actual implementation  of tariffication  raises a number of issues.  As  the possibility
of tariffication has been introduced  only after  two years  of negotiations, it has had
less  discussion  in the  GATT  and  outside.'
3  Among  the issues  that  arise  are  the
inclusion  of policies  to  convert to  tariffs,  the  choice  of base  period and tariff  level.
In addition it is useful to see how tariffication  might apply to particular  commodity
situations.
Choice  of policies  to  convert to  tariffs
The argument for tariffication usually rests on the comprehensive  conversion
of  all  non-tariff  import  barriers  to  fixed  tariffs  (ad valorem  or  specific).  These
would include quotas, variable levies, minimum import prices, state trading, and the
use  of  restrictive  import  licenses,  as  well  as  voluntary  export  restraint  (and
voluntary  import  expansion)  agreements.  These  policies  act  at  the  border  and
relate directly to trade.'  The notion of tariffication  is weakened  if it only  relates
to some types of trade  barriers (e.g.,  quotas):  problems  of transparency and market
isolation would  still exist.  Such ad hoc tariffication  could form part  of a traditional
request/offer  negotiation  on specific  policies  and  commodities.  A formulation  for
widespread  adoption would need  to be more comprehensive.  It might, for instance,
cover  all  non-tariff import  measures  that  are  not  explicitly  allowed  for  in  GATT
articles  (such as those justified under Article XX  on grounds  of health  and  safety).
Though  not  suggested  in  the  US  proposal  or currently  under  discussion  in
the  GATT,  it  would be conceptually  possible  to  tariffy  policies  that  do  not  act  at
the  border.  A  consideration  of  the  problems  to  which  this  might  give  rise
illustrates  the  importance  of  limiting  tariffication  to  the  conversion  of  border
measures.  Many  domestic  policies  influence  trade,  by  changing  incentives  to
domestic production,  by  increasing costs  to consumers,  or  by imposing  health  and
other regulations  that impede commerce.  In principle,  there is a "tariff equivalent"
(TE) of all  such  policies,  at least  for importing  countries.'  The  TE  will  be that
tariff,  which  will  have  the  same  effect  on  trade  (i.e.,  volume  of  imports)  as  the
policy  in  question.  But  imposing  a  tariff  of  this  level  may  have  unwanted
consequences.  If  the  policy  were  in  the  form  of  a  producer  subsidy,  with
consumers buying at world market prices,  the imposition  of a tariff at the  TE level
would imply a fall  in producer  prices.  The  tariff that would  keep  producer  prices
the same  would  necessarily  reduce  market  access.'6
There  is  a more  fundamental  problem  with  the  conversion  of domestic  (as
opposed  to  import)  policies  to  tariffs.  Many  policies  are  specifically  aimed  at
particular situations.  A fertilizer subsidy may be  aimed  at increasing fertilizer  use;
a credit  subsidy may be  aimed  at encouraging  investment.  Trade  policies,  such as
tariffs,  may be  clumsy  and  inefficient  ways  of achieving  these  specific  objectives.
This  issue  is  particularly  relevant  to  developing  countries,  who  (in  spite  of the
attraction  of tariff revenues)  may not  find tariffs  a satisfactory  substitute  for  more
carefully  targeted  development  policies.
Tariffication  is, of course, not designed to  deal with  export policies.  It  could,
however,  have  an  important  limiting  effect  on  such  policies.  Most  countries  that
run  export  subsidy  policies  also  maintain barriers  (often  quotas)  against  imports.
Without  such  back-up  policies,  goods  exported  at  a lower  price  than  those  ruling
on  the  domestic  market  could  be  reimported.  In  the  absence  of  high  transport
costs,  such arbitrage  would  ultimately  defeat  the object  of the export  subsidy.  In
this important sense,  tariffication  extended to areas where imports do  not presentlyexist  (i.e.,  to the  export  commodities  of the  major  trading  countries)  could  prove
a valuable  'back  door" way  of dealing  with export  problems.
If such  an indirect approach  is not convincing,  one  could think  of an  analogy
with tariffication  that  could relate to export  subsidies.  Though  no name  exists for
such  a  concept  ("export  subsidication'?),  it  is  straightforward  to  describe  its
implications.  The replacement  of variable  export subsidies  and  indirect  assistance
to exporters  with  fixed subsidies  (which  would  presumably  be bound)  could  be  an
advantage  over present  arrangements.  Such  subsidies  would  be  transparent  and
could be reduced  by negotiation.  On the other hand,  many of the  same problems
arise  as  with  tariffication.  A  fixed  export  subsidy  does  not satisfy the needs  of  a
policy  designed  to  unload  domestic  surpluses  and  maintain  internal  prices.  Any
attempt  to  persuade  exporters  to  fix  such  export  subsidies  would  entail  the  risk
that they would be set at high levels and become a more  permanent part  of export
strategy.  Export  subsidies  to  get  rid  of occasional  surpluses  may  be  temporarily
disruptive,  but their institutionalization  in the market  could  be more  serious  over
time.  For  these  reasons,  export  subsidies  (and  domestic  subsidies  in  exporting
countries)  are  more  appropriately  dealt  with  by either  changes  in  GATT  rules  or
by inclusion  in  an AMS.
Choice  of levels  and base periods
A tariff might,  in principle,  be preferable  to a non-tariff measure:  in practice
it  will  depend  on  the  height  of  the  tariff  and  the  extent  to  which  it  can  be
negotiated  down  over  time.  Choosing  the  initial  height  of  the  tariff  is  not
straightforward.  The  decision  will  have  both  technical  and  political  components.
At the technical  level,  it is possible to  envisage  the tariff that would  maintain  the
level of imports entering under the non-tariff barriers.  The United States proposal
suggests  a simple  way of calculating  this tariff equivalent--that  of taking the price
gap between domestic and world prices.'?  This price gap will approximate  the tariff
equivalent  under  competitive  conditions,  but  in  many  cases  there  may  be  trade
implications  from such  a procedure.'"  How  serious  this  discrepancy  is will  depend
on  the circumstances.1 9
The  real virtue  of tariffying the price gap is its simplicity, both  in terms  of
technical  requirements  as well  as  political acceptability.  But the price gap method
is not without  major problems.  Under the price  gap approach,  some  commodities
may face  higher trade  barriers than before.  This  will be the  case  if the price gap
overstates  the  "true" impact  of the  non-tariff  border  measure  on  price.  "High"
price  gaps are particularly  visible  in Japan,  where the government  has  argued  that
imports  (of rice,  beef and  oranges)  would  tend  to  sell for  less  than  the  domestic
product  in  free  trade.  Exporting  countries  will  attempt  to  minimize  this
overstatement  where  it exists.  Consequently,  the  US  comprehensive  proposal  of
October  1989  suggests  tariff-quotas  in  an  interim  period,  where  the  exporter  can
be  assured of at  least  the level  of access  available  before  tariffication.  The tariff
quotas  would  expand  over  time.
Importers  will  be  more  concerned  with  the  other  possibility;  of  an
understatement  of protection  levels.  If the imported  food would  normally  sell  for
more  than  the  domestic  product,  the  price  gap  will  be  less  than  the  impact  of
protection.  In  this case,  using  the price  gap  to  fix  the tariff  will  cause  domestic
prices  to  weaken.  This  could  be  the  case  in  developing  countries,  where  the
imported  commodity  may  sell into  a  limited  urban  market  at  a price  distorted  by
exchange  controls.'  A  tariff  based  on  the  price  gap,  in  place  of other  policies,
could  lead to  a rapid  increase  in imports.  For  this reason,  the  US  comprehensiveproposal  makes  the  suggestion  that safeguards  be  put in  place  to  guard  against
sudden  increases  in import levels.
There are other problems with the use of a price gap to measure  the  needed
tariff.  In  some  cases,  there will  be  imported  goods that really  have  no  domestic
substitute.  In  other  cases  there  will  be  goods  that  would  have  been  imported
under  lower  trade  barriers:  but  since  they  were  not  imported,  there  are  no
established  import  prices to use.  Then  there  is  the question  of the definition  of
goods.  Groups  of products  which  under  the SITC  headings,  for example  different
types of cheeses,  currently enter some  countries under  quotas.  In  such  cases, the
problem  will be  one of computing  price indices  for composite  domestic  goods,  and
calculating  composite  world  reference  prices  to  compare  with the  domestic  price.
Besides  the  method  of calculating  the  tariff,  the  base  year  chosen  for  the
calculation  will clearly make  a difference  to this height.  The negotiation  over base
periods (as in the case of the AMS)  will determine whether liberalization  is actually
achieved.  Choosing  a  base period  where  world  commodity  prices  were  low  (as  in
1986)  will  clearly  tend  to  build  in  high  levels  of protection  and  put  a  greater
burden  on  reduction  schedules.  On  the other  hand,  this may be  the  only  way to
get  agreement  by  the importers.
On the political level, because tariffs are not perfect substitutes for non-tariff
import barriers  importing  countries  will  want  to  extract  a  "price" for  tariffication.
In particular, if variable  levies have  been high  in  the period prior  to  negotiations,
it may be  'difficult  to  resist the  argument  that an  equitable  tariff  will include  all
that protection against low prices.  Importers  who have argued  for years that world
prices  are artificially  depressed  will start to  argue that  they  must be prepared  for
such conditions and include protection  in the tariff against  such dumping.  Whether
much  liberalization  could be  expected  in  such  circumstances  is  doubtful.  And  if
world  prices  rose,  then  internal  prices  in  importing  countries  could  be  increased
considerably by the  conversion to fixed  tariffs.
Impact of tariffication  on specific  markets
Discussion  of  tariffication  as  an  option  for  the  trade  negotiations  must
ultimately  come  down to  its impact  on  individual  commodities  and  policies.  One
way  of testing such  a translation from  concept  to  application  is to  look  at a  few of
the  existing  policies  that  seem  to  be  most  troublesome  to  international  trade.
Listed  below  are  twelve  policies  that  might  constitute  a  reasonable  test  of  any
negotiated outcome:  if these policies are not influenced significantly,  then the talks
will  have  achieved  little.  They  could  be  thought  of  as  the  "dirty  dozen"  of
industrial country  policies.  Tariffication  addresses  many but  not  all  of the  trade
problems  raised by  these policies.
A tariffication  agreement would  have  a direct impact  on US sugar  and  dairy
policies.  At  present,  import  quotas  are  maintained  under  the  domestic  price
support regimes, tolerated by the  GATT because  of the  1955  Waiver. 21  Conversion
to  tariffs  would  remove  the  anomaly  of  the  waiver  and  could  be  seen  as
constructive  by potential  exporters of dairy products.  Sugar exporters,  by contrast,
might  expect compensation  for  the loss of quota rents  presently  accruing to  them
in  the  US  market.  Return  of  tariff  revenue  to  the  developing-country  sugar
suppliers  could resolve  this  issue.  Domestic  sugar  and  dairy  interests,  presently
against  tariff protection,  might  be  persuaded  to  accept  this  change  in  policy  as  a
part of  an international agreement.Impact  of  Tariffication  on  Selected  Developed-Country  Agricultural
Policies  of Key  Significance  to the Agricultural  Negotiations
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EC  policy  would  be  radically  affected  by  an  agreement  to  tarifly.  Thiimpossible  to maintain an open-ended commitment  to buy at a fixed price at a time
when prices were  falling on world markets.  Other causes  of trade friction,  such  as
EC  oilseed  subsidies  and  beef hormone  regulations  would  not  be  challenged  by
tariffication,  though the former  might potentially  be converted  to  a tariff under  a
rebalancing  proposal.
The  impact  of  tariffication  on  Japan  would  be  felt  largely  through  the
modification  of the  marketing  structure  for  domestic  and  imported  produce.  In
the  case  of rice,  where  only  limited private  trading  is  allowed,  tariffication  could
imply  an extension  of private  trading.  If the  only  restriction  allowed  on  imports
was a fixed tariff, then importing firms  could compete  with  the state agency in the
domestic  market.  In  practice,  such  a  development  will  probably  occur  without
tariffication,  but the pace  of change could be accelerated  by the trade negotiations.
Whether such changes  would cause substantial rice imports depends  upon the level
of tariffs set, which  in turn will be determined by the method used to calculate  the
tariff equivalent.  Japanese  sugar imports,  subject to  a variety  of duties and  levies,
and carefully  controlled  by  a  state  agency,  could  increase  with  tariffication--again
depending upon the height  of the tariff.
Tariffication  should  have  less  of an  impact  on  Canadian  import  policies,
except  for  those  for  the  dairy  sector,  and  little  effect  on  domestic  and  export
policies  for  grains.  The  dairy  industry  is  characterized  by  supply  management
that keeps  domestic prices  at a relatively  high level.  Cheese  imports  are governed
by quota, and other dairy products are prohibited or tightly restricted.  In principle,
it is  possible  to set  a  tariff at a  level  that  would maintain  the  same  price  as  do
present import restrictions.  In practice,  the impact of domestic supply management
is altered by the existence  of a fixed tariff.  The world price plus the tariff provides
an  upper bound to the extent  to which  prices  can be raised  by  supply  control.  A
fall in world prices would lower domestic prices, with supply management powerless
to  stop  the  impact  on  domestic  producers.  On  the  other  hand,  variations  in
domestic  output and demand  would  have less  effect on price,  as the  availability  of
imports would  add stability to the  domestic  market.
There  is  no  doubt  that  domestic  policy  in  these  various  country  and
commodity situations could be changed to incorporate  a fixed tariff in place  of non-
tariff import measures.  Because  such  a change  implies a modification  in  domestic
policy  acts as  a reminder that tariffication  is  not just  a technical  matter  confined
to trade policy  discussions.  The  chances  for  tariffication  would  seem  to be better
if  accompanied  by  policies  which  enhance  domestic  market  stability  and  by  a
reduction  of trade  (and output)  regulation.
Rebalancing and Trade  Policy
The phrase  "rebalancing" has  come  to  refer  to  a  particular  set  of  issues  in
agricultural  policy.  The  EC has for  some time been aware  of the fact  that different
levels  of  support  and  protection  in  closely  related  agricultural  markets  lead  to
problems.  Similar issues  are of concern  in other countries:  most governments  pay
attention  to relative  prices  when  setting  policies.  But  the  problem  has  become
particularly  acute  in  the  EC.  High  levels  of  protection  for  certain  commodities,
such  as cereals,  milk and products,  sugar  and olive  oil,  contrast with  low  levels  of
protection  for oilseeds,  vegetable  oils and non-grain  feed  ingredients.  Surpluses  of
grains (wheat, and more recently  feed grains), of butter and skimmed milk powder
(non-fat  dried  milk), and potential  surpluses of olive  oil  have been  blamed  in part
on  the low  levels of protection  on imports  of substitute  products.  Rebalancing,  in
the context  of the GATT talks,  thus has a fairly  precise  meaning.  It refers  to the
ability of the EC to  establish some  type  of import controls on  non-grain feeds  andon oilseeds  and oilseed products at the same time as support is reduced for  cereals
(and  possibly  for dairy products,  sugar  and  olive  oil).
The  case  for rebalancing levels  of  support
A  case can be made  that  an unbalanced  level  of protection  can create  more
distortions  to  agricultural  markets  than a  balanced  level  of protection.  Economic
theory would suggest  that a uniform tariff, for instance,  is generally  more efficient
than a  schedule  of disparate  rates as a way  of shielding  import-competing  sectors
from  exchange  rate distortions.  This would  hold while the uniform  tariff is set at
or below  the  (weighted)  average  of the  disparate  tariff rates.  Indeed,  a uniform
tariff coupled  with  a similar  uniform export  subsidy  may cause  even  less resource
allocation  distortion:  trade policy,  in effect,  would merely  cancel out the distortions
generated  by  the exchange  rate  misalignment.
Free trade  is  an example  of a uniform  tariff,  where  the uniform  tariff rate
is,  of  course,  zero.  This  will  tend  to  be  the  "best" uniform  tariff  for  a  small
country,  under  the standard  assumptions  of competitive  markets.  However,  if an
importer  has  the  power  to  influence  world  prices,  the  "optimum" tariff may  be
neither  zero  nor  uniform.  A  different  level  of tariff  will  be  needed  to  exploit
market power  in each  separate  market.  Similarly,  if protection is granted  by non-
border  measures  (such  as  producer  subsidies,  or  subsidies  on  inputs)  to  correct
some  perceived  market  failure,  the  optimal  level  of  those  subsidies  will  differ
depending  upon  the magnitude  of the divergence  that the policy  aims  to correct.22
As  a result,  there  is no  theoretical  reason  why  uniform protection  will  always be
better than  unbalanced  protection,  and a strong presumption  that  it will often  be
worse.
The  argument for balanced protection is better considered  in terms  of policy
administration.  A  high  level  of price  support  in  one  sector  will  shift demand  to
other  products,  some  not even  available  when  the protection  is  first given.  This
increases  the  cost  of the price  support  policy  both  in  terms  of budget  outlay  (as
exports  increase  or imports decrease)  and trade  conflicts.  To  correct the problem,
either the price  support has  to be  reduced in  the favored product  or consumption
of the related product must be  curbed--or  both.  If the "imbalance" is unintentional
and serves  no purpose,  then rebalancing would  seem  to represent  a sensible policy
correction.  Whether  this  can  be  done  without  further  budget  costs  or  trade
disruptions  depends  upon  the circumstances  under which  it is  tried.
If the  EC  persists  in  granting  protection  in  cereal  markets  (i.e.,  charging
prices to users that are above  world market  levels), then some policy  problems can
be  reduced  by  putting  a  similar  tax  on  use  of  non-cereal  feeds  while  reducing
protection  for  cereals.  This  also  would  have  beneficial  budgetary  impacts,
decreasing  spending on grain export subsidies  and (potentially) bringing in revenue
on  non-cereal  tariffs,  which  would make  it attractive in  domestic  political  terms.23
Several domestic interests would be hurt by such  change:  animal feed compounders
(who  have invested  heavily in facilities at the ports),  oil processors;  manufacturers
of margarine, and other vegetable  oil-based food products; and not least, consumers
of these  products.  The impact  on livestock  farming  would  depend  on  the balance
between  grain  price  cuts and  non-grain  feed  price  increases. 2
The problem with rebalancing is that even if it reduces or leaves unchanged
the  overall  level  of protection,  it  can have  significant  impacts  on  particular  trade
flows.  It matters little to the foreign  supplier that such  trade flows are themselves
a  result of the imbalance  in  protection,  and the  domestic  policy  problems  causedby  "disharmonies"  matter  even  less.  Uneven  protection  creates  its  own
constituency.  US  soybean  producers  have  as  much  vested  interest  in  the
continuation  of the  unbalanced  policies  as do  EC  cereal  farmers:  the former  have
benefitted from  the latter's political  strength.
More  specifically,  US  soybean  producers  may  lose  from  both  aspects  of
rebalancing.  They would lose not only  from new EC duties  on oilseed imports  but
also from  a  cereal  price  cut  in  the EC.  Though  the  cereal  price  cut  is supposed
to  compensate  third-country  exporters,  it  would  impair  the  rights  of  cereal-
substitute  producers.  Therefore,  the  solution  to  the  rebalancing  dilemma  is
inherently  more  difficult  than  that  of reducing  protection  in  one  single  market.
The  protection  increase  in  the  unprotected  sector  will  raise  problems  that  could
essentially  stop  progress  in  all  sectors.  Harmonized  protection  levels  may  be
desirable  in itself, but it may be possible  that at  a time  of trade  negotiations  "you
cannot get  there  from here!"
Rebalancing  and GATT  obligations
These  issues would be serious  enough  if EC rebalancing merely  threatened
exporters  of soybeans,  corn  gluten  feed,  etc.,  with  loss  of markets.  It  is  made
much  more problematic  because  the low protection  on  these products  is bound  in
the  GATT.  Agreements  in  the Dillon  Round  of GATT  negotiations  led to  a zero
binding  on  import duties  for  oilseeds  and  meals,  and  in  the  Kennedy  Round  the
tariff on  cassava  pellets  was  bound  at six  percent.  The  EC  could  adjust  these
bindings (i.e.,  adjust or withdraw  the "concession" made to its trading partners) but
it  would  have  to  enter  into  consultations  and  negotiations  with  the  principal
supplier  and  probably  with  other  interested  parties.  These  negotiations  would
have  to  lead  to  compensation  for  lost  market  access,  a  difficult  problem  if  the
United  States  argued  that  such  compensation  should  be  in  agricultural  trade.
Without  compensation,  the  injured  parties  could  retaliate  with  trade  sanctions
against  the  EC.
The  "complication" of the GATT  binding has other  implications.  In political
terms  the EC binding of a zero  soybean  duty is regarded  by exporting interests  in
the  United  States as  one  of the few  benefits  gained  in  GATT  negotiations.  The
'"price"  that  would  have to  be paid  by the EC  to get the  United  States  to  agree to
the  unbinding of the zero  duty, within  the  context  of the  Uruguay  Round,  would
be high.  It would certainly  have  to include  some  irreversible  changes  in the  CAP
that  could  be  sold  domestically  in  the United  States  as having  equivalent  value.
Rebalancing  and other aspects  of negotiations
Under the traditional request-and-offer  type of trade negotiation,  rebalancing
would  be explicitly  "on the table," to be discussed  along with the policies  of others.
The  EC  would  presumably  have  to  offer  a  reduction  in  grain  market  protection,
conditional  upon  a higher tariff  on non-grain  feeds  and oilseeds.  Other  countries
would  decide  whether  they  were  interested  in  striking  a  deal  with  the  EC  for
policy  changes  of their  own.  The Uruguay  Round  has opened  up the possibility  of
a  different  form  of  negotiation.  If  an  AMS  were  used,  then  the  exercise  of
rebalancing  takes on a very different  complexion.  If the overall level of AMS  across
all  commodities  were  bound,  the  EC  could  rebalance  its  protection  within  that
constraint.  The attraction  of the  AMS  approach  for  the  EC  may  not be  entirely
unrelated  to  this possibility,  and  it  may  also  account  for  some  of the  US  concern
about the  effectiveness  of an AMS  reduction  (unless  to  zero)  to  open  markets.
10On  the  other hand, it is  of course possible  to devise AMS  rules that  would
prevent  significant  rebalancing.  Sector-by-sector  AMS  targets  would  not  allow
protection  to be raised  in the oilseed and cereal by-product  markets.  Even without
such  sectoral  limits,  a side  condition  could be  imposed  that  would  constrain  any
increase  to  less  than  a particular  percentage."  The  EC  would  presumably  object
to  an  AMS  that  allows  no  degree  of rebalancing  at  all.  Indeed,  it  appears  that
the  EC expects  rebalancing  to be dealt  with  separately  from,  and  outside  of, any
type  of  AMS  arrangement.  Moreover,  if  AMS  commitments  should  relate  to
producer  support  only,  rather  than  to  consumer  taxation,  the  substitution  of  an
import duty on oilseeds  for the current EC deficiency  payments  would  as such  not
affect  the AMS  commitment  of the  EC.
The  AMS  approach  offers  a  new  context  in  which  rebalancing  can  be
achieved, but it does not solve  the problem that a "concession in the  hand is worth
two  in  the  bush."  Given  the  general  mistrust  in  the  United  States  of  the
intentions of EC  policymakers, the reductions  in  CAP protection  that balanced the
increases  would  have  to  be  credible  and  secure.  It  is  unlikely  that  a  loose
agreement  to  reduce  an  AMS  would  be  satisfactory  without  the  guarantee  of  a
GATT  binding.  However,  an  AMS  based  on  variable  world  prices  and  exchange
rates may also be too volatile  a measure  to bind.  Reductions  in  a fixed-base AMS,
such  as suggested  by the  EC,  could  be bound  for a transitional  period--in  essence,
binding domestic  policy  prices.  Under these  conditions,  a "country plan"  (such  as
suggested by the US) could  contain the details of the rebalancing.  Exporters  would
know  that the reductions  and the  increases  in protection  were  equally  controlled
for the  duration  of the agreement.
Rebalancing  in  Practice
However  much  one  might  argue  the  merits of rebalancing  at  a conceptual
level,  the  issue  is  one  of  practical  politics.  In  the  EC  there  are  differences  of
opinion  among  member states  on  the merits of rebalancing  protection.  Livestock
farmers  tend to  take  a view different  from that of cereal farmers  in  the  EC,  and
the  agricultural  processing  and  supply  industries  are  very  much  involved  in  the
issue.  The  feeling  in  the United  States also varies  by  industry, and  rebalancing
would have uneven  effects on different export sectors.  It will all come down  to the
instrumentation  of rebalancing,  the levels  of balanced  protection,  and the  needed
compensation  for those  who  lose  by rebalancing,  which  depends  upon  the impact
on  specific  markets.
Instrumentation of Rebalancing
The  type  of policy  changes  used to  implement  rebalancing  can  affect  their
acceptability.  The  EC would,  if it  could proceed  without  any  constraints,  probably
prefer that non-grain feeds and oilseeds  be  included in  the Community's  regime of
variable  levies.  However,  given the general  thrust  for getting away  from variable
levies  in  the  GATT,  it appears  unlikely  for the agreement  on  new variable  levies
in  a sector  where  they  didn't  exist  so  far.  Another  solution  would be  tariffs  on
imports  of  grain-substitutes  and  oilseeds.  This  has  the  advantage  of using  an
instrument  of support  that  is  transparent  and  negotiable--and  that  is  apparently
consistent  with  the United  States  emphasis  on  tariffication  of import barriers." 7
Converting  a  policy  of protection  through  deficiency  payments  to  a  tariff
poses  a  particularly  serious  problem.  A  tariff  that  gives  the  same  price  to
producers  as a  deficiency  payment  will  reduce  imports.  The  reason  is  simple:  a
deficiency  payment is "decoupled" on the consumption  side.  The  consumer  pays in
taxes  rather than at  the  food  counter.  The  tariff is  a  fully  coupled  policy,  the
11support coming through the market in proportion  to consumption  and production.2 8
If, however,  a  deficiency payment  were  converted  to  a  tariff with  the  same  trade
effect (the tariff equivalent),  then  the producer price  would  drop  in the  protected
market.  It is not clear  why  the exporter  would  wish  to  impose  this reduction  on
the importer  for no  gain  in market  access.
A third option  would be to enter into voluntary  export  restraint agreements
with  all  those  suppliers  of non-grain  feeds  that  are  not  yet  covered  by  existing
self-restraint  agreements.  From the point of view  of the  countries  exporting  non-
grain  feeds into  the EC,  an export  restraint agreement  might--if  any  new  regime
is being considered  at  all--be the  least  objectionable  solution.  In purely  economic
terms,  a  self-restraint  agreement  might  even  be  of  benefit  to  the  exporting
countries.  In legal  terms,  a voluntary  export  self-restraint  agreement  would  give
away less of the rights of exporters  than would  an unbinding of EC  tariffs  on non-
grain feeds.  On the other hand,  export restraint agreements  would  imply all sorts
of technical  and legal problems.  Moreover,  it would  be politically  difficult  for the
exporters,  who  have  always  claimed  that  they  wanted  free  access  to  the  EC
market,  to  agree  to  a  new  restriction  that  they  themselves  would  have  to
implement.  Such  arrangements  may  have  to  offer  the  prospect  of  eventual
unimpaired market  access.
A fourth option would  be a tariff quota under which  a given quantity  would
be imported into the EC at low duties, while imports in excess  of that quota would
be  levied  at  a  higher  rate.  For  example,  the  EC  could  seek  an  agreement
according to  which it would continue  to  import the current volume  (or the volume
in  a given base  period,  or the  current  volume plus x percent)  at  the  existing  low
or  zero  duties,  while  any growth  of imports  beyond  that base  volume  would  be
subject to  higher  (possibly prohibitively  high)  levies  or tariffs.  29
From the point of view  of the EC  such  a tariff quota may  be  a particularly
attractive  option.  It would  provide  the  "security" which  some  people  in  the  EC
seek,  in terms of making sure that  any attempts by  the EC  to  reduce its domestic
cereals  production  are  not  undermined  by  increasing  inflows  of  non-cereal  feed
ingredients.  At  the same  time,  it would  not make  the situation  for  EC livestock
producers  and  feed  compounders  more  difficult  than  it  currently  is  (though  it
would,  of course,  worsen  their situation  relative to  what  it might  have  been  with
other  arrangements).  For similar  reasons  this  option  may  be  more  palatable  for
exporters  than a  flat-rate  duty.
Levels  of "balanced"  protection
It  is clear  that the EC's  emphasis on  rebalancing  is mistrusted  in  the  US.
As a result,  the  act of rebalancing per se would  have  to  be seen  as  resulting  in  a
significant  reduction  in protection,  at least  on cereal  if not on other products.  This
reduction  would  have  to  offer  the  United  States  the  prospect  of  increased  corn
sales  or significantly  less  competition for wheat export markets.  It is unlikely that
a 5-10 percent cereal price  cut would  be enough  to meet this criterion:  a  reduction
of 20-25  percent  in  cereal  prices  could  make  a significant  impact  on  demand.
One  way of linking  rebalancing with  liberalization  would  be  to  focus  on  the
price  of  compound  feeds.  If the  combination  of price  cuts  for  cereals  and  price
increases for other  feed ingredients  resulted  in a significant  decrease  in compound
feed  price,  then  demand  for  ingredients  would  expand  in  total.  In  addition,
livestock farmers would benefit--unless the "rebalancing" reduced  their output prices
by  more  than  enough  to  offset  this  effect.  The  feed  price  would  act  as  a
convenient  index  of protection, and  the method  of calculating  it  could be  agreed
12upon  in the  GATT.  Should  a fall  in  the  value  of this  index  require  too  large  a
cereal price cut, the EC could offer direct payments of a temporary nature to cereal
farmers,  paid  in  part  by  increased  corn  levies  and  savings  on  wheat  export
subsidies.
Attractive  as this option  may be,  it is not without  analytical  and  conceptual
difficulties.  In  particular,  there  can  be  ambiguities  regarding  the  reference
situation.  For  example,  according  to  its  "stabilizer" scheme,  the  EC  is  in  the
process  of reducing,  gradually,  its support  prices  for cereals.  Hence,  it  could  be
that without any cereals price reduction beyond that resulting from the "stabilizer"
scheme,  the  absolute price  of compound feed would  go down  even  with a  (modest)
increase in the duties on substitute  imports.  Thus, in principle, the compound feed
formula  approach  to  the  quantification  of rebalancing  would  work  only  if it were
possible  to  specify  the  future  development  of EC cereals  prices  in  the absence  of
any  agreement  on  rebalancing.  The  actual  negotiations  may  come  close  to  this
principle  in  the sense  that negotiators may seek  agreement  on  the general design
of support  reduction  that  would  apply  to  all  participating  countries.  This  could
precede  the separate  set of negotiations between  the EC and substitute  exporters
in  which  agreement  would  be  sought  on  rebalancing  and  on  the  additional
reductions  in  cereals  support that  the EC  would  have  to  achieve.
Whether  such  a  "compound feed  formula"  approach  to the  quantification  of
rebalancing  would work also  would  depend on  the instrumentation  of rebalancing.
For example,  if the tariff quota option were  chosen it would be difficult to estimate
the  effect  which  this regime  would  have  on substitute  prices  in  the  EC.
Impact of rebalancing on  specific  markets
It  is  likely  that  in  the  end  a  predominantly  political  agreement  must  be
sought  on the extent of new restrictions  (if any)  to EC imports  of non-grain  feeds.
A major  factor in these negotiations will be the type and  size of compensation  that
the  EC  can  offer.  Without  compensation,  rebalancing  has  to  offer  enough  in  the
way  of price  reductions  to  offset  the price  increases.  If compensation  is paid  in
other  areas  of  trade,  then  it  would  be  less  necessary  to  achieve  a  balance  of
advantages  in the feed  and oilseed  sectors  alone.  The EC may  feel that  it cannot
reduce  cereal  prices  enough  to  offer  significant  market  expansion.  In  that  case,
some  part  of the  compensation  could  come  in  other  areas.  The  problem  is that
cereal  by-products  and  soybean  sales  from  the  United  States  to  the  EC  tend to
dominate  the sales  of other agricultural  products.  It is not clear  what  concessions
the  EC  could  give  that  would  make  up  for  any  losses  in  the market  for  soybeans
and corn  gluten  feed.30  This  depends  largely  on the  specific  impact  of rebalancing
on  individual  markets.
The  impact  which  rebalancing  would  have  on  specific  markets  would,  of
course,  depend  on  the size  of tariff and price  changes  in  the EC.  One  particular
set  of  such  policy  changes  has  been  analyzed  in  a  comprehensive  project,  the
"Disharmonies" study.  31  In this study it has been  assumed that  the  EC institutes
a  10  percent  import  tariff  on  all  oilseeds  and  meals,  as well  as  on  all  non-cereal
feeds,  while  it  reduces  its  cereal  prices,  as  well  as  producer  prices  of oilseeds,  by
20  percent.32  Such  policy  changes  would  have  significant  effects  in  the  EC,  on
world  markets  and  on  exporters.
3 3
In  the  EC, production  of  cereals  and  vegetable  protein  would No  down  by
around  13 percent,  while  livestock  output would  expand  (see Table  1).  Domestic
use of cereals  would increase by around  12 percent,  while that of vegetable protein
and  cereal  substitutes  would be  reduced,  by  10  and  6 percent  respectively.  As a
13consequence,  EC net exports of cereals would be reduced.  Under the assumptions
made  in  the  study,  the  EC  would  even  turn  into  a net  importer  of  cereals  (see
Table  2)."  Net imports  of vegetable  protein  would,  also,  go  down.  However,  the
import reduction  is moderated by the fact that domestic  EC production of vegetable
protein  would  shrink in reaction  to lower  producer  prices.  Net  imports  of non-
grain feeds would, also, be reduced.  In value terms the change in the cereals trade
balance  would,  though,  be  significantly  higher  than  the  changes  for  vegetable
protein  and  cereal  substitutes.  Changes  in  EC  trade  flows  would  trigger
adjustments  in  world  market  prices.  World  market  prices  for  cereals  would
increase  by  around  5  percent,  while  those  for  vegetable  protein  and  cereal
substitutes  would be depressed,  by  2 and  10  percent respectively.
Table  1.  Domestic Effects  of Rebalancing  in the EC
Supply  Domestic  Use
Base  Change  Base  Quantity  Change
Commodity  Quantity  (Percent)  Million  Tons  (Percent)
Grains  138.00  -13.86  10800  1251
Feeds  1558  14  "''  I%55''.22'5  2897  573~;:;S;;:
Poultry.14.90..82........  .. 4.0....42
Non-Cere al
Feeds  15.568  1  .45289 ~  ~  ::.::st~s~s:. ~si~tz..  zzz.t.  . ~  s~t.~  ~ ~  ~ ~z  '23..  :  ................ ~::::~: :  ~::..............  J~~::~:~:  ~.1.
Table  2.  World  Market:~:~t  Effect  ofRealncng  CanesinECNeEpot
Million  Million  Million  Price  Change~  2
Por&  Poultry  060  06337301
~  ~:~  ~  ~  ;  :~:~:,...............  .....  ... ,,, Sugar.............. Q~f~f:  ~  ..................  :  .........
ugar  11.70  9.  0  -. 1
Source:  Koester  et  al  Disharmonies  in  EC  and
1Measure,  EC Publications  Office,  Luxembourg,  1988,  hpe  7
Table 2. World Market Effects of Rebalancing:  Ca  ees  t  Edpinth
and World Market Price Changes.
Base  Change  Ctin  getablpoin(e.
soybeanomeal)tnonaoin  d (.,cp  cena
rpotedhee.  3heUS0griulura.tadebaanc  2wold.8pov5by$20mlin
14and  the  United  States  would  gain  $430  million  from  higher  export  prices.  a
Moreover,  lower  deficiency  payments  for  cereals  would  cause  a  budget  saving  of
$1,750  million  in  the  US.  On  the other  hand,  because  of lower  soybeans  prices,
total value  added  in US  agriculture  would  drop by  $1,290  million,  and because  of
higher  cereals  prices,  US  consumer welfare would be reduced by $300  million.  On
aggregate,  United  States overall economic  welfare would  increase  by $160  million.
Of course the nature and extent of impacts on specific markets  and individual
third countries depends  decisively  on the particular  combination  of policy  changes
in  a  rebalancing  package.  It  will  be  a  matter  of negotiation  to  see  whether  a
design of rebalancing can be agreed upon  which offers the expected benefits to  the
EC and  that at the same  time is acceptable  to  the Community's  trading partners.
Tariffication  and Rebalancing  as  Elements  in a Package
It is clear  from the discussion  so  far that tariffication  is of direct  interest to
the  United  States  and  of  some  concern  to  the  EC,  while  rebalancing  is  of
considerable  concern to the United States and a central  objective  of the EC.  A deal
might therefore  seem possible  with elements  of one  being "traded" for elements  of
the  other.  Both  however  have  to  be  taken  in  a  context  broader  than  bilateral
negotiations.  Though  the  EC  and  the  United  States  will  clearly  have  to  reach
agreement,  active  support  from  the  Cairns  Group  and  Japan  along  with
acquiescence  from  other  countries  will  be  necessary  for  success.  The  issue
addressed  here  is  whether  both  tariffication  and  rebalancing  can  be  part  of  a
successful  GATT package for agriculture.  This involves looking at the compatibility
of T and R,  their  role in the context  of AMS  reductions  and potential  GATT  rule
changes, and the implications  of each for other countries party to the negotiations.
Compatibility
Tariffication  by  itself, if applied  to  the  EC  cereal  and  other  sectors,  would
probably  have  to  be  at  a high  initial  level  of protection  to  be  acceptable  to  the
EC.37  Rebalancing,  by  contrast,  might  require  sharply  lower  cereal  prices  and  a
very modest  levy on  non-grain  feeds  and  on oilseeds  to  be  acceptable  to  the  US.
The two may  be imperfectly  compatible  at present.  One  possible way  out of this
dilemma  is to introduce  these  steps one at  a time.  Tariffication  could be  agreed
to as  a goal  but not implemented  until domestic  EC prices  were  closer  to  world
price levels.  This also would imply that internal EC prices would be close  to world
prices for  those commodities  that they would  continue  to  export.
This suggests  that the immediate  objective  should  be  to  reduce  EC  cereal
and oilseed support prices, reducing the imbalances among commodities.  Lower EC
cereal prices would increase grain consumption, and reductions in oilseed production
subsidies  would help to prevent further erosion in that market.  Rebalancing would
be allowed, subject to limits on tariff levels for cereals, oilseeds  and byproducts  and
non-grain  feeds or if necessary with quantitative  access  guarantees.  Converting all
protection  to  tariffs  would follow  this period  of support  reduction.
For  an  initial  period,  the tariffs  could  be  allowed  some  movement  to  grant
a  degree  of internal  price  stability.  This  could  be  done,  for  instance,  by  basing
variable  levies  on a moving  average  of world  prices.  Alternatively,  an upper limit
could  be put  on  the variable  levy (and,  of course,  on  the level  of export  subsidy
paid).  This would  reproduce  the behavior  of a fixed  tariff  at  times of low  world
prices,  but  allow  the  domestic  price  to  be  stable  as  prices  rise.  After  some
experience  with  such  quasi-fixed  tariffs,  a bound tariff could  be  introduced  at an
agreed level.
15Linking with Other Aspects  of the Negotiations
Even if tariffication could  be made consistent  with rebalancing, the issue  still
arises of their compatibility with  other aspects of negotiations.  What  impact would
a package have  on the negotiation  of AMS reductions or of changes  in  GATT rules?
Tariffication in itself would  seem  to be  consistent with both AMS  negotiations
and  rule  changes.  It  involves  policy  changes  which  will,  among  other  things,
increase  the  transparency  of  border protection.  As  mentioned  above,  this  will
incidentally  simplify  the  measurement  of  support.  But  tariffication  applies  only
to  non-tariff  import  measures,  it  does  not  obviate  the  need  to  monitor  and
negotiate  a  reduction  in the  levels  of  support.  It will  simplify  the  rewriting  of
Article  XI,  by  removing  several  import policies  inadequately  covered  at present.
But it does  have  the potential problem  of 'legitimizing" the  protection inherent in
the NTBs  that the  tariffs would  replace.
Rebalancing,  in  a similar  way,  does  not pose  any  direct  threat to  the  AMS
negotiations  so  long  as the AMS  chosen  allows  for rebalancing  within  the  context
of support reductions,  and there is not apparent conflict  between  rebalancing  and
rules  changes.  However,  the concept  of rebalancing may be  enough  to  undermine
the case  for an AMS negotiation--as  opposed to using an AMS  purely for monitoring.
If countries  felt  that rebalancing was  being  introduced by  the  back door  as  a  by-
product of negotiating  on  an AMS,  then  this could  reduce  its appeal  to  countries
other than the  EC.
The combination of tariffication, rebalancing,  and other approaches therefore
needs to be  carefully considered.  Tariffication needs to be introduced gradually and
as  an  integral part of  the  process  of  negotiating  reductions  in  support.  If  tariffs
are set  too  high,  for  the sake  of getting  agreement,  then  the  process  of support
reduction will  be  delayed.  Tariffication  as  a "principle" (a  goal  to  be reached  over
a period of  time)  would  enable  rules on  import barriers to  be  clarified.  All  access
barriers could  be  bound  in  the  GATT,  and  all  access  measures  not  specifically
provided  for  in  the  GATT  could  be  phased  out.  Tariffication  would  be  one
mechanism  by  which  one  reaches  that state  of  affairs.  Rebalancing  would  be
consistent  with this development  only  if it were  done in minimally trade-distorting
ways.  In  so  far as rebalancing  was  necessary  to  get  agreement,  some  additional
trade distortions might be tolerated.  But if rebalancing resulted  in significant  new
trade barriers to established  patterns of imports, then it could  effectively  halt the
process  of  liberalization  envisaged  in  the Punta del Este  declaration.
Implications  for Other Countries
Both  tariffication and rebalancing will impact  other countries besides  the EC
and the US.  Tariffication  as a principle  of trade policy  would  have  a major impact
on  the  conduct  of agricultural policy  in  other developed  countries  and change  the
nature of world markets.  The greater impact of international market developments
on  domestic  prices  (the  "recoupling" of  domestic  prices  to  world  markets)  is
generally  regarded  as  beneficial.  It may,  however,  need  to  be  accompanied  by
policy  changes  toward other methods  of price and income  stabilization.  These  could
include  price-responsive  grain  reserves  (although  history  suggests  this  would  be
difficult  to  achieve),  well  designed  safety-net  programs  and  income  insurance
schemes.  Developing  countries  should  benefit  from  the  greater market  stability,
so  long as the increased  fluctuation in domestic  prices  in developed  countries  does
not induce  another form  of instability.
16Whether  tariffication  would prove acceptable  as a model  for import  policies
of  developing  countries  is  less  certain.  Tariffs  may  not  fit  in  with  current
marketing systems, and may not give the degree of control  over imports and import
prices  that many  countries  presently  enjoy.  To  try to  force  such  policy  changes
now  may  be  undesirable,  although  one  element  of  the  special  and  differential
treatment  sought  by  developing  countries  might  involve  an  agreement  not  to
institute  new NTBs  and to replace state  control  of imports  with fixed  tariffs  over
an  extended  period.
Rebalancing  in the  EC is  likely  to have  impacts  on  developing  countries,  in
particular through the effect on the market  for oils and for animal feed ingredients.
Exporters  of tropical  oils  have  always  been  concerned  about  the  possible  loss  of
their  EC  markets  arising  from  a  fats-and-oils  tax.  The  US  position  has  helped
those  countries.  If  rebalancing  were  to  involve  access  guarantees,  then  these
exports would have  to make  their  own  case.  The  artificial  EC market for cassava
chips has  been one  of the  most visible  signs  of the imbalance  in  the  CAP.  A full
rebalancing would remove much, if not  all, of that market.  Again,  the US pressure
to keep open  the EC market for citrus pulp and corn gluten feed presumably helps
Thailand:  if corn became  more competitive  again  as an animal feed,  these  starchy
feed  ingredients  would  compete  for a  reduced market  in  Europe.
Rebalancing,  if accepted  as a principle  in the negotiations,  also  would  have
implications  for the  policies of other  countries.  Japan,  Canada,  Korea,  and  many
other countries  have  "unbalanced" protection.  They may consider that this lack of
balance  is  either  desirable  (because  of strongly  divergent  needs  for  support)  or
inevitable  (because  of the power  of particular farm groups).  Rebalancing  may be
even  more  problematic  in such  cases  than in the  EC.  In Japan, for  instance,  a
rebalancing  of support  between  rice  and  other commodities  could  be beneficial  to
the structure  of agriculture,  and it might be done  so that the  resulting degree  of
overall  protection  was  lowered.  But  the  degree  of  imbalance  is  so  great  that
import access  for a number  of products  could be significantly  harmed  if protection
on  some  commodities  was  increased to  offset  the  loss  of support on rice.
Even  in  those  cases  where  rebalancing is viewed  as  desirable,  as  in  the EC,
it may be difficult  to match  with trade  liberalization.  This is because rebalancing
redistributes  the 'burden"  around  the  exporting  countries,  and the  sectors  within
those countries.  As  such,  it is bound to hurt those who have  come  to regard their
overseas  markets  as  "rights", even  if others  will  gain  at  their  expense.  Unlike
selective  importer  liberalization,  which  holds  few  negative  threats  for  exporters,
rebalancing may  pose  a political  dilemma for the exporter.  The  exporting  country
may  have  to  find ways  of compensating  the  losers in  such  situations  even though
there  is a  welfare  gain for  the country  as a whole.
Hence,  tariffication  and rebalancing  are issues  that  involve  far more players
than just the EC and the United  States.  Tariffication  is likely  to  appeal  to other
exporters  and  have  indirect beneficial  effects  on  developing  countries  that import
grains.  Those  that  might  benefit  from  rebalancing include  countries  that export
grains  but  not oilseeds,  such  as Australia."  Opposing  rebalancing  will  be  oilseed
and byproduct exporters  (Brazil, Malaysia,  Indonesia) and non-cereal  feed  exporters
(Thailand).  Caught  in  between  are  those  countries  that export  both  grains  and
oilseeds,  such  as  Canada  and  Argentina.  The  support  or  opposition  of  these
countries  will  depend  on  their  perceptions  of  the  costs  and  benefits  of  any
particular  tariffication  and  rebalancing  package.
17Conclusions
Tariffication  and  rebalancing  represent  two  elements  in  the  Mid-Term
Agreement  in  the Uruguay  Round.  Tariffication  is offered by the United States as
a way to improve market  access.  Conversion of non-tariff import  barriers to  tariffs
would have  considerable  advantage  to  the exporting countries.  Such  tariffs  would
be  transparent,  bound,  and  easily  negotiable.  Importer  markets  would  be
"recoupled" to world markets,  and competition  in those markets would be enhanced.
Conversion  of non-tariff  measure  to  tariffs  holds  considerable  advantage  for  the
GATT,  and would facilitate  the  revision  of the agricultural  rules.  On  the  other
hand,  tariffication  is unlikely  to  be  welcomed  by  the  importing  countries.  Non-
tariff barriers  are  usually  there for  a purpose,  to  stabilize  the  domestic  economy
or to  support  a particular  system  of domestic  marketing.  To  change  to  tariffs  in
such  circumstances  would  clearly  be  difficult,  and  would  limit  the  possibility  of
agreement  in the Uruguay  Round.
Rebalancing levels of domestic protection,  primarily in the EC,  is an objective
born  of the difficulties  in  administering  the  CAP.  Whereas  the trade  negotiations
seek to reduce  protection,  rebalancing  implies  an increase  in  some access  barriers.
Such  increases  would  in  any  case  require  GATT  negotiations  and  some  form  of
compensation  offered  for  trade  injury.  Though  there  may  be  some  merit  in
avoiding  undue  dispersion  of levels  of protection  for  closely  related  products,  it
would  seem  to  be  more  consistent  with  the  underlying  thrust  of the  Uruguay
Round  to reduce such  a dispersion  by  bringing down  high  levels  of support.
Rebalancing,  therefore,  is best considered  as a change  in  domestic  policy  on
the part of the EC that requires agreement  in the GATT.  Tariffication by contrast
is a  change  in  trade  policy  beneficial  to the  GATT  but  requiring  domestic  policy
modifications.  Over a period,  both  could be achieved.  Tariffs  could be  phased  in,
by  such  means  as putting  upper limits  on  variable  levies  or  on  the  selling  prices
of parastatal  importers.  Movement  to  an  eventual  tariff-only  system  might  be
initiated in the Uruguay  Round along with other  aspects of the negotiations,  such
as the reduction in  support levels.  Rebalancing  could  be allowed  so  long as it  was
accomplished  in  a way  that minimizes  trade disruptions.  It  would  be treated  not
as a desirable  principle  but  as  a way  of dealing  with  the reality  of an  unbalanced
policy.  The trade disruption  could be minimized  by means  of access  guarantees  or
by  ensuring  that  the  average  level  of protection  for  all  closely  related  products
decreases.
One danger  of the  emphasis  on tariffication  and rebalancing  on  the part  of
the United  States  and  the EC  is that the  multilateral  trade  talks  on  agriculture
may become  even more  a bilateral  negotiation.  Not  only would  this downplay  the
interests  of other  exporting  countries,  but  it  may  make  an  agreement  harder  to
reach.  The  agenda  for the Uruguay  Round,  strengthened  by the  political  support
given by  the  OECD  Ministers  and  the  Economic  Summit  meetings,  represents  a
rare  opportunity  to  improve  the  agricultural  trading  system.  It  would  be
unfortunate  if this chance  is  lost  because  of the  EC's  dislike  of  tariffication  and
the distrust of the United States for the notion  of rebalancing protection.  Though
both elements could appear  in a final package,  they should be considered  firmly  in
the context  of the overall  objective  to  achieve  a more  open  system  of agricultural
trade  and  less  disruptive  domestic  farm  and  food  policies.
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reducing  "disharmonies"  in  EC policies.  See  U. Koester,  et al,  Disharmonies  in EC
and  US Agricultural  Policy Measures,  EC Publications  Office,  Luxembourg,  1988.
2  The  consultations  have  also  to  include  the  country  with  whom  the  initial
concession  was negotiated.  See GATT Article XXVIII  and the discussion in Koester,
et  al,  p.  19/25.
2  One  example  of  such  a  side-constraint  has  been  suggested  by  Franklin,  who
suggests  that  there  could  be  a  10  percent  limit  on  any  protection  increase.  See
Michael  Franklin,  Rich  Man's  Farming:  The  Crisis  in Agriculture,  RIIA,  London,
1988,  p.  82.
27 This  option  was  explored  in  the  "Disharmonies"  study  prepared  for  the  EC
Commission.  Koester  et  al.  (1988).
2  Converting  a policy  which  is  decoupled  or  partially  decoupled  on  the producer
side  will  also  negate  any presumed beneficial  trade effects.  This  is likely to be the
case  where  supply  control  (or expenditure  limitation) policies  are  in  effect.  Such
policies  are,  however,  more likely  to  be  found in  exporting  countries.
2029  Such  a  solution  would  be similar  to  the  existing arrangement  between  the EC
and  the  non-Thai  exporters  of manioc.  In  this  arrangement,  the  levy  on  above-
quota imports  would be equal  to the  levy  on barley  imports  which means  that for
all  practical  purposes  it is prohibitive.
30  If  rebalancing  is  to  take  place  within  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiation,  the
compensation  could  be  in  the  form  of changes  in  other  policies  by  the  EC.  The
exact  degree  and  form  of compensation  need  not  be  calculated.  The  package  of
actions  taken  together  in  the  agricultural  negotiations  (and  in  other  parts  of the
Uruguay  Round)  will  have  to  be  acceptable  to  all parties.
31 Koester  et  al.  (1988).
32 As  far  as  oilseeds  are  concerned,  the  assumption  was  that  the  EC  lowers  its
deficiency  payments  to producers while  instituting the new  tariff.  Hence producer
prices  come  down  while  user prices  for oil  and meal  go  up.  Livestock  and sugar
prices  were  also  assumed  to  fall  in  some  of the  scenarios.  However,  the  results
reported  here assume  no change  in  livestock  and sugar  policies.
33  The  results  reported  below  are  from  the  "global"  model  used  in  the
"Disharmonies" study,  see  Chapter  17  in  Koester  et  al.  (1988).  More  detailed
results, including  results for more  disaggregated  commodity  groups,  are presented
in other  chapters of that study.  Base  quantities  and prices  used in  the study  are
1986  trend values.
34  Milk  and  sugar  output  does  not  change  because  it  was  assumed  that  quotas
remain  in  place.
3 It  should  be  remembered  that  these  results  come  from  a  "comparative  static"
model,  which  abstracts  from  technical  change  and  other  dynamic  elements.
Absolute  levels  of trade  in  the  future  are  not projected  in  the  study.
36  The  results in the Koester  study are given  in  ECU.  In  1986,  1 ECU  was roughly
equivalent  to  1 US  dollar.
37 The  EC  currently  imports  6  million  tons  of grains  and  exports  over  30  million
tons.  Changes  in  import  policy  alone  will  not  have  a  major  effect  on  access  into
the  EC  cereal  market.  However,  as  explained  above,  tariffication  could  have  the
effect  of limiting the level of export  subsidies that could be paid  on cereal  exports.
38 Dairy  product  and  beef  exporters  would  benefit  if  rebalancing  included  the
livestock  sector.
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